Connecting the dots…

September 21st, 2009

Guest Contribution by Rachel Beach

Microcredit and property rights reforms, how do they connect? The Panel Group was first asked to connect the dots between financial services to the poor and security of property in discussions with organizations such as the World Bank, Gates Foundation and International Trade Agency (ITA). The exercise brought to light a multiplicity of connections, and in the process we discovered that this is actually a very relevant and necessary discussion to promote. Indeed, it is a relationship whose identity is increasingly touched upon in current development debates.

An increasing number of articles and platforms address the importance of securing wealth bound up in physical real estate, small entrepreneurial activity and intellectual property as incentive for further investment and economic growth.  In a recent profiling by Fast Company, June Arunga – celebrated by the magazine as one of this year’s 100 Most Creative People – is asking a very common question but coming up with an answer at once banal and profound:

‘Why is Africa so poor?’ says the Kenyan, from her current home in Ghana… ‘What should be encouraged is the fundamental right of people to own land and the products of their labor, which are then recognized by courts, and can be exchanged at the market.” Asking for aid, she says, is part of the problem. “I doubt there is a parent that raises their child to become a beggar,” she says. “Gain respect. Keep your promises.”

Security and legal recognition of property for the poor is something development agencies are slowly waking up to. It is something De Soto recognized and has been both praised and vilified for – tapping into the wealth of the poor. One side criticizes him for finding another brilliant way to extort the poor, “formalizing their wealth” so it can be taxed by the government and their property sold to developers. The other side recognizes something elemental in development: access to credit and securing of property (i.e. not simply physical real estate but all forms of wealth) are essential. Between these two elements are a host of incentives. And their interplay entertains many fields of study: the psychologies of security and self-improvement, incentive to invest, the dynamic of trust and credibility between a State and its citizens, hope.

The connection between the credit-access and property-security is not merely curious, it is fundamental to development. In fact, it is a symbiotic relationship. Without a reasonable guarantee that property will be protected both from expropriation or theft, the acquisition and maintenance of investments and other assets in a given economy is illogical, as many an African dictator’s holding of properties abroad (read: securer states) and Swiss bank accounts will attest to. On the other side, without access to credit, the ability to invest is severely restricted.

Capitalism has struggled to find meaningful ways to bring the poorest brackets of society (and those operating in the “extra-legal” sectors due to any number of structural and financial barriers) into the market economy. Financial services for the poorer sectors look very different than the services to the wealthy. However, the risks they face, the way they operate, and types of basic services needed should not be treated as an exception to the standard middle-class or wealthy citizen’s fundamentals of wealth management and financial services. Indeed, the middle-class and wealthy are the minority in this world we live in.

Micro-credit is not simply a well-meaning, social business enterprise that should be patted on the back and politely applauded while we go about our business in the real world. Micro-credit is the type of financial service needed for a great majority of the world’s population. It is more than finding creative ways to “help the poor”. Micro-credit allows the impoverished to slowly rise out of a cycle of poverty. Securing of property rights for these small enterprises and private citizens gives owners legal, socially-recognized protection of their newly acquired parcels of wealth, however minute. Any high-school lecture about compound interest will attest to the benefits of savings and investment, however small one’s start. This creation of wealth then slowly builds on itself.

Neither Peru nor Bangladesh are anecdotes (as Peter Shaefer seems eager to claim in his Foreign Policy article). Yunus’ Grameen bank is expanding operations on five continents, including successful start-ups in the United States and the birth of one in Italy. Our work at Panel Group explores insecurity of property rights around the world – as Elena did in Peru during the 1990s – partnering with municipalities and governments to strengthen, streamline, and even create socially, legally recognizable ownership of physical property (i.e. real estate) where none existed before. Without the dual-expansion of financial services for the poor and security of their assets, the poor will remain in a cycle of poverty.

Guest Contribution by Henry Musa Kpaka

President Obama’s speech in Ghana outlined his commitment to sub-Saharan African economic and social development (see the Economist article, Barack Obama and Africa: how different is his policy). His message was to usher in a new strategy for development assistance from the U.S. and perhaps the rest of the West.  The debate over ending poverty and bringing economic and social development to sub-Saharan African has exhibited an increasing number of facets in recent years.   One stemming from the rather dismal results from the heavy use of aid, encouraged development agencies such as the World Bank to turn their attentions to the promotion of trade liberalization, macroeconomic and monetary stability, and privatization, all embodied in the structural adjustment programs aka “Washington Consensus”.  Following the poor results and frequent failures of this strategy, a new line of thinking emerged, one with a lot of potential to lift the continent out of poverty: institutional reform.  President Obama was quick to echo this in his Accra speech: “Africa does not need strongmen, it needs strong institutions”.

The focus on institutions as a means to lasting prosperity for all in sub-Saharan Africa has been around far longer than the Obama administration, but this administration is giving it some steam, and rightly so.  A few economists and development practitioners have written about the impacts of institutional reform in sub-Saharan Africa.  In criticizing traditional foreign aid in her book, Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo observes that aid impairs African institutions. One implication she gives: public revenue/tax collecting institutions are largely absent because African leader build their budget with revenues coming mostly from aid.  Elena Panaritis also spends some time in her work, Prosperity Unbound talking about institutional reform in developing countries.  Panaritis, whose work focuses on transforming the informality of property and property right systems into formal legal systems in developing countries, describes the importance of institutions.  In her words, “institutions structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic. In other words, they hold together and protect the social contract by enforcing contracts and laws and providing a sense of certainty in human exchange”.

The immediate economic benefit from efficient institutions as various economists have outlined is that it reduces transaction costs of all kinds (i.e. time, money, imperfect information).  Markets work well when there is a predictable and legitimate set of rules that governs doing business.  Well-functioning institutions also promote accountability and give a voice to the poor. The Obama administration’s efforts (making a speech and creating new policy directives are two different animals, the question is how much weight will he put behind the rhetoric) to endorse this approach is certainly a step in the right direction.  My only concern is that this approach has already become another “Washington Consensus” that wipes out all other ideas.

The question of what kind of reform should be promoted is addressed by Dani Rodrik: “The type of institutional reform promoted by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, or the World Trade Organization is biased towards a best-practice model. It presumes it is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante and views the convergence towards those arrangements as inherently desirable. This approach,” Rodrik continues, “encourages cross-national comparisons, benchmarking.” All of which he rightly claims are based on first-best mindset. He proposes a second-best approach where institutional reform is promoted in a case by case basis, where focus is placed on areas of quick wins and high impact results. Growing up in Sierra Leone, it was easy at first to reject a second-best approach for my continent. However, Rodrik’s idea makes a lot of sense.  Different countries, even in sub-Saharan Africa have different approaches in doing business and rely on unique arrangements of formal and informal institutions. A “one size fit all” approach may cut transaction costs in the short run but has high potential to fail.  The heavy reliance on institutional performance indicators, like the Good Governance Index, can easily misguide us, lead to waste, and subsequently to yet another retreat of a potent solution to the poverty problem in sub-Saharan Africa.  Institutional reform holds a lot of promise for development in sub-Saharan Africa if applied appropriately.

http://www.finreg21.com/homeTHE U.S. PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEM IS SEVERELY BROKEN: We need to treat this crisis as an opportunity not only to install a more rigorous regulatory regime for the financial sector…we need to overhaul the way property rights and property values are established in this country. We need a structural reform that establishes standards for how property is evaluated and how it is offered to the market.
Elena Panaritis, author, Prosperity Unbound: Building Property Markets with Trust