Washington D.C.’s education reform could use a reality check
March 9th, 2010
Education provides an interesting case of institutional reform. The administration of education requires no overarching agenda. Reforms can be done piecemeal, tackling one particular problem at a time with reforms accumulating on top of each other in layers …. The means of achieving education improvements tend to contradict each other. Incentive structures breakdown under complex arrangements of competing agendas. Sometimes intended incentive structures for reaching high education standards are never established.
The public – at large – feels inadequate to tackle the how’s of education. Sensing a lack of expertise in the area parents leave the agenda setting to the suppliers of education. The suppliers of education are represented by teachers’ unions. Teachers’ unions come with their own set of priorities which are often counterproductive to improving education process (i.e. tenure and job security, resisting performance-based initiatives).
Educational reform pays very minimal dividends for a politician. A politician needs positive outcomes of reforms to be visible before the next election cycle comes around. However, a president does gain points by claim to undertaking educational reform during his term. So while the fundamentals and substance of the reform may not be visible for a decade’s time, the fact of having instigated any semblance of reform gains him higher approval ratings among the public. Thus, we find education reform guided by the interaction of these two key forces: teachers’ unions and the executive branch. With each bringing their contravening reform agendas, reform outcomes increase capacity (i.e. more schools, more teachers, and more computers) which is positive for all, and neglect to restructure incentives to improve quality and efficiency, which threaten teachers’ job security.
In the 1990s over a dozen Latin American countries underwent educational reform. While the objectives of the reforms were to improve quality and efficiency as well as capacity, the reforms generally improved capacity and decentralized administration but failed to make any significant improvements in quality and efficiency of education. The region, as a whole, scores very poorly on international standard tests, particularly in reading and mathematics. Major efforts were poured into the educational reforms throughout the 1990s, and presidents across the region could boast of their achievements on the campaign trail. Twenty years later, we’re recognizing that the reforms haven’t substantiated improvements of quality and content in the process of learning.
Educational reform, then, is an area that very much benefits from Reality Check Analysis. To disregard existing institutional arrangements, broken incentive structures, layers of reform agendas piled on top of each other, combined with the expectations of making concessions to the parties present at the negotiating table will engender superficial adjustments with outcomes that fall far short of intentions. But by the time outcomes are realized, a former president might be finished writing his memoirs.
Effective educational reform requires policy entrepreneurs and a reform team combining all the elements affected by education (which might not always be brought to the table) including: parents, administrators, teachers, other regional power players and the executive branch leading the reform. Step one is to corporately create a vision for where the country wants to be in ten, twenty years. Looking into the future, it is generally fairly easy to come to a consensus of direction: “we want to improve math and reading skills, to be on par with East Asia”, for example. Starting from this point effectively commits all parties to the reform team to finding a way to achieve these ends. It brings a common agenda to the interests of all key players: “we all want to achieve the same ends, bettering our children’s education”.
Secondly, it builds trust among the parties to reform. For instance, teachers are reassured that the government’s goal is not simply to find a new source of revenue to redirect elsewhere in the budget by cutting teachers salaries, or that administrators want to find an excuse to fire their educators. The goal instead is to help make teachers the best teachers they ca be.
Third, following Reality Check Analysis, the team must dig into the relevant legislation and explore the nuances of all relevant state and local educational institutions. the proposed reforms must take the interaction of these power players, their desires to maintain a ‘place at the table’, and discretionary powers. The goal is two-fold: either replace existing legislation with an entirely new system, or encompass existing regulations into the reform plan. Secondly, work together to find a win-win situation for everyone. Teachers’ unions will be more likely to make concessions if they’re given the opportunity to negotiate behind closed doors as part of the reform team than confronted with a completed ‘take it or leave’ reform agenda.
Innovative approaches are possible. In Washington D.C. Chancellor of D.C. schools Michelle Rhee tried to take on the tenure issue, with an opt-out for teachers: you can either 1) keep your tenure at same pay, or 2) opt out of tenure and agree to performance reviews, with the opportunity to almost double your salary. The problem: the teachers union would not even let the teachers vote on it. The union fears the consequences and resulting diminished power of the union. Maybe a reform team approach, using Reality Check Analysis could help bring consensus to improve the quality of education in our nation’s capital.
